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summary proceedings can proceed expeditiously to final judgment,
subject, of course, to occasional reversals by a superior court.
JUDIciARY LAw

Judiciary Law § 753A: Section narrowly construed.
Section 753A of the New York Judiciary Law empowers a court
of record to punish "a neglect or violation of duty, or other misconduct,
by which a right or remedy of a party to a civil action or special proceeding, pending in the court may be defeated, impaired, impeded, or
prejudiced.. .

."

Although the section obviously bestows broad powers

upon a court, it has been narrowly construed by a lower court.
The plaintiff-husband in Shapiro v. Shapiro248 moved to punish
the defendant-wife for failure to comply with the visitation rights
granted him in a final judgment of separation rendered by the Supreme
Court of Nassau County. This motion was made in the Supreme
Court, Nassau County-now the situs of a divorce action predicated
upon the judgment of separation. The divorce action was properly
before the court, and jurisdiction existed over both parties. Since the
Queens County Supreme Court would have a record of the final
separation judgment for purposes of making a determination in the
divorce action, it would appear that the most logical and practicable
place to make the motion would be in Queens County. However,
Justice Brown held that the court was without jurisdiction to hear
the motion and that plaintiff would have to move in the court that
rendered the judgment of separation. This decision was reached in
spite of plaintiff's urging that the motion should be granted in order to
safeguard his summer visitation rights from continued violation.
The decision finds support only by taking a narrow view of the
phrase "pending in the court" as it appears in section 753A. The court
defined it to mean the specific court hearing an action or rendering the
final judgment. However, the supreme court is one of general jurisdiction and designations as to venue do not limit the powers of the
court as to subject matter.2 49 Therefore, a more liberal and sounder
interpretation of the phrase would indicate that the Supreme Court
of Queens County had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the
motion.
Moreover, it should be noted that this was a motion on notice.
248 60 Misc. 2d 622, 80 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
249 See, e.g., 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 501, supp. commentary 11 (1969).
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This fact would also make CPLR 2212(a) applicable. That section
states:
A motion on notice in an action in the supreme court shall be
noticed to be heard in the judicial district where the action is
triable or in a county adjoining the county where the action is
triable.
Although the "adjoining county" provision is discretionary with
the court, and courts will usually exercise this discretion to transfer
the motion to the judicial district where the action is triable,250 the
Shapiro facts clearly fall within the intendment of this statute as well.
Thus, in view of the circumstances and the clear statutory authority
for hearing the motion, the Supreme Court, Queens County should
have granted the relief sought.
ELECTION OF REMEDIES

Election of Remedies: Summary judgment against bankrupt precludes
showing of fraud in subsequent action.
In In re Galich,251 the respondent objected to petitioners' motion
to discharge its judgment pursuant to section 150 of the New York
Debtor and Creditor Law.2 52 Previously, in 1966, the respondent had
sold clothing valued in excess of $1000 to the petitioners on credit.
Two weeks later, they filed petitions in bankruptcy. However, some
two months before petitioners were adjudicated bankrupts, the respondent obtained an order for summary judgment against them. The
judgment entered upon this order was the one in question in the instant
proceeding.
Respondent contended that the petitioners had falsely represented
their solvency in a credit statement it had requested at the time of the
sale. This allegation, it argued, prevented discharge of the judgment
it had obtained. - 3 The court examined the complaint in the action for
summary judgment and found no allegation as to fraud. Moreover,
there was no basis whatsoever in either the pleadings or the judgment
from which fraud could be deduced. Apparently, the respondent had
250 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 2212, supp, commentary 14 (1968).
25159 Misc. 2d 836, 300 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Monroe County Ct. 1969).
252 N.Y. DEBT. & CrED. LAW § 150 (McKinney 1945).
253 A party shall not be discharged where he obtains money or property on credit "in

reliance upon a materially false statement in writing respecting his financial condition
made or published or caused to be made or published in any manner whatsoever with
intent to deceive .. " Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 851 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2)
(1964).

